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Abstract. We study a newly introduced network model of the pollution control
and design approximation algorithms and truthful mechanisms with objective to
maximize the social welfare. On a high level, we are given a graph whose nodes
represent the agents (sources of pollution), and edges between agents represent
the effect of pollution spread. The government is responsible to maximize the
social welfare while setting bounds on the levels of emitted pollution both lo-
cally and globally. We obtain a truthful in expectation FPTAS when the network
is a tree (modelling water pollution) and a deterministic truthful 3-approximation
mechanism. On planar networks (modelling air pollution) the previous result was
a huge constant approximation algorithm. We design a PTAS with a small viola-
tion of local pollution constraints. We also design approximation algorithms for
general networks with bounded degree. Our approximations are near best possi-
ble under appropriate complexity assumptions.
Keywords: Algorithmic mechanism design, approximation algorithms, planar
and tree networks
1 Introduction
Environmental degradation accompanies the advance in technology, resulting in global
water and air pollution. As an example, in 2012, China discharged 68.5 billion tons
of industrial wastewater, and the SO2 emissions reached 21.2 million tons (National
Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013). The recent annual State of the Air report of the
American Lung Association finds 47% of Americans live in counties with frequently
unhealthy levels of either ozone or particulate pollution [2]. The latest assessment of
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air quality, by the European Environment Agency, finds that around 90% of city inhab-
itants in the European Union are exposed to one of the most damaging air pollutants
at harmful levels [1]. Environmental research suggests that water pollution is on of the
very significant factor affecting water security worldwide [19]. It is the role of regula-
tory authorities to make efficient environmental pollution control policies in balancing
economic growth and environment protection.
We give new algorithmic results on the pollution control model called a Pollution
Game (PG), introduced in [3], and inspired by [15,6]. We briefly describe applications
of PG to air pollution control presented in [3]; for precise definition of PG see Section
2. In the first application, the graph’s vertices represent pollution sources (agents) and
edges are routes of pollution transition from one source to another. The government as
the regulator can decide to either shut down or keep open a pollution source (by selling
licences to agents) taking into account the diffusion nature of pollution (emission at one
source affects the neighbors at diminishing level). It sets bounds on global and local
levels of pollution (called global and local constraint(s), resp.), aiming to optimize the
social welfare. The emissions exceeding licences, if any, must be cleaned-up (hence,
agent’s clean-up cost). In the second application [3], vertices represent mayors of cities
and edges the roads between cities. The percentage of cars moving from one city to
another is represented by the weight of the corresponding edge. The model allows the
regulator to auction pollution licences for cars to mayors. The pollution level of an agent
(mayor), i.e., the number of allocated licences and their prices, is set by the regulator.
Here we also consider an application of PG to water pollution in rivers, modelled
by tree networks. In water pollution the government decides which pollution sources
should be shut down so that the effluent level in water is as low as possible. Water
pollution cost sharing was introduced in [17] and the network is a path (single river).
This model was extended to tree networks (a system of rivers) in [10]. We also model a
system of rivers as a tree, but study a different pollution control model, i.e., [3].
Our Results. We present best possible algorithmic results for trees and planar graphs
when we allow a small violation of the constraints on local pollution of every agent
(called a local constraint). Suppose first that the objective function is linear. Then, for
PG on trees we obtain an FPTAS and this is the best we can achieve as PG is weakly
NP-hard [3] on stars. For planar graphs the best known result was a big constant approx-
imation algorithm [3]. We design a PTAS with (1 + δ)-violation of the local pollution
constraints for any δ > 0, and this is tight as we prove that the problem is strongly NP-
hard on planar graphs even with (1 + δ)-violations. By using a Lavi-Swamy technique
[16] we prove that our FPTAS for trees leads to a randomized truthful in expectation
mechanism. In addition, we also design a deterministic truthful mechanism on trees
with an approximation ratio 3 + . Suppose now that the objective function is 2-piece-
wise linear or general and monotone. Then for graphs with degree at most ∆ we obtain
O(∆)-approximation algorithms and a Unique Games-hardness within ∆/ log2∆.
Technical Contributions/Approaches. Suppose that the objective functions are linear.
When the network is a directed tree, a somehow non-standard two level dynamic pro-
gramming approach is designed to obtain an FPTAS for PG with binary variables. This
approach is crucial to deal with the global constraint. For that we design an FPTAS for a
special multiple choice, multi-dimensional knapsack problem where coefficients of all
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General objective function Linear objective function
Bounded Degree ∆ Trees Planar
Lower bound Ω( ∆
log∆2
) NP-hard strongly NP-hard (δ violation)
PG(poly) O(∆)a FPTAS TiE O(1) DT PTAS (δ violation)
PG(general) O(∆) TiE b FPTAS TiE c O(1) TiE [3]
a Monotone increasing obj. function. b Piece-wise linear obj. function with one shift
and an additional mild assumption. c Running time is polynomial in q.
Table 1: Our results. TiE/DT: truthful in expectation/deterministic truthful mechanism.
PG(poly) is PG with poly-size integer variables, PG(general) without this assumption.
constraints except one are bounded by a polynomial of the input size; this generalizes
the results in [7]. A similar idea is applied to design deterministic truthful mechanisms
on trees and a PTAS for PG on planar graphs with (1 + δ)-violations.
To obtain our PTAS for planar PG with (1+δ)-violations, we first use known round-
ing techniques (e.g., [14,8]) to make all the coefficients polynomially bounded. Then,
we design a dynamic programming approach to solve PG on graphs with bounded tree-
width tree decomposition. Finally, we combine a special (called nice) tree decompo-
sition of k-outerplanar graphs, Baker’s shifting technique and our two-level dynamic
programming approach for dealing with the global constraint, obtaining our PTAS.
Even when polluters’ cost functions are linear with a single parameter, simple mono-
tonicity is not sufficient to turn our algorithms into truthful mechanisms. This is because
polluters’ utility functions have externalities – they are affected by their neighbours.
Thus, we need to use general techniques to obtain truthful mechanisms: maximal in
range mechanisms (for deterministic truthfulness) and maximal in distributional range
mechanisms (for truthfulness in expectation). The deterministic truthful mechanism for
trees uses a maximum in range technique (Chapter 11 and 12 in [18]).
For piece-wise linear objective functions on bounded degree graphs we prove that
PG is ∆ column sparse so a randomized algorithm of [5] is applicable. For general
monotone objective functions on bounded degree graphs we prove that the objective
function is submodular and use randomized rounding with alterations.
Organization. Section 2 contains definitions and preliminaries, and our results on trees
are in Section 3. Section 4 presents our results on planar graphs, and, finally, Section 5
discusses general objective functions. All missing details and proofs will appear in the
full version.
2 Preliminaries
Model and Applications. We describe the model and mention two applications follow-
ing [3] to gain an intuition. Consider an area of pollution sources (e.g. factories) each
owned by an agent. The government’s goal as a regulator is to optimize the social wel-
fare, restricting levels of emitted pollution. Thus, given a weighted digraphG = (V,E),
where V is the set of n pollution sources (players, agents) and edge (u, v) ∈ E means
u and v are geographic neighbours, i.e., (u, v) ∈ E if the pollution emitted by u af-
fects v. For each (u, v) ∈ E weight w(u,v) = wuv is a discount factor of the pollution
discharged by player u affecting its neighbour v. W.l.o.g., wuv ∈ (0, 1], ∀(u, v) ∈ E.
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The government sets the total pollution quota discharged to the environment (by the
number of pollution sources that remain open) to be p ≥∑v∈V xv , where xv ∈ {0, 1}
denotes if pollution source v ∈ V will be shut down or not. Each agent v has a non-
decreasing benefit function bv : R≥0 −→ R≥0, where bv(xv) is a concave increasing
function with bv(0) = 0, representing v’s benefit. Each v has a non-decreasing damage
function dv : R≥0 −→ R≥0, and bv is concave increasing, bv(0) = 0 and dv is convex
increasing 5. Player v’s total welfare rv is v’s benefit minus damage cost: bv(xv) −
dv
(
xv +
∑
u∈δ−G(v) wuvxu
)
, where, δ−G(v) = {u ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E}, δ+G(v) = {u ∈
V : (v, u) ∈ E}. Thus, v is affected via the damage function by his own pollution if
xv 6= 0 and by the total discounted pollution neighbours. This models that pollution
spreads along the edges of G. The government decides on the allowable local level of
pollution pv , for every v ∈ V , which imposes the following constraints for every v ∈ V :
xv ≤ qv, xv +
∑
u∈δ−G(v) wuvxu ≤ pv. The first application assumes xv ∈ {0, 1} and
qv = 1, ∀v ∈ V and the second xv ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qv} and qv ∈ N.
The problem of social welfare maximization is the following convex integer pro-
gram (1)-(4), called a pollution game (PG) on G, where (2) is called global constraint,
(3) are local constraints, and xv +
∑
u∈δ−G(v) wuvxu is the local level of pollution of v.
max R(x) =
∑
v∈V
(bv(xv)− dv(xv +
∑
u∈δ−G(v)
wuvxu)) (1)
s.t.
∑
v∈V
xv ≤ p (2)
xv +
∑
u∈δ−G(v)
wuvxu ≤ pv, ∀v ∈ V (3)
xv ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qv}, ∀v ∈ V (4)
Value qv is decided by
the government and for
this application qv =
1. We call (1)-(4), PG
with integer variables
(if xv ∈ Z) or with bi-
nary variables (if xv ∈
{0, 1}). For an instance
I of PG, |I| is the num-
ber of bits to encode I , and if q ∈ poly(|I|), q = maxv∈V {qv}+1, we call (1)-(4), PG
with polynomial size integer variables.
Basic Definitions. Let I = (G,b,d,p,q) be an instance of PG, b = (bv)v∈V , d =
(dv)v∈V , p = (pv)v∈V and q = (qv)v∈V (bv is private information of v and other
parameters are public). Let I be the set of all instances, and X the set of feasible alloca-
tions. Given a digraph G = (V,E), Gun = (V,Eun), where Eun = {(u, v) : (u, v) ∈
E or (v, u) ∈ E}. A mechanism φ = (X,P ) consists of an allocation X : I → X and
payment function P : I → R|V |≥0 (X(I) satisfies (2)–(4)). For any vector x, x−u de-
notes vector xwithout its u-th component. Note, rv(X(I)) = bv(Xv(I))−dv(Xv(I)+∑
u∈δ−G(v) wuvXu(I)) is the welfare of player v underX(I). A mechanism φ = (X,P )
is truthful, if for any b−v , bv and b′v , rv(X(bv, b−v))−Pv(bv, b−v) ≥ rv(X(b′v, b−v))−
Pv(b
′
v, b−v). A randomized mechanism is truthful in expectation if for any b−v , bv and
b′v , E(rv(X(bv, b−v))−Pv(bv, b−v))≥ E(rv(X(b′v, b−v))−Pv(b′v, b−v)), where E(·)
is over the algorithm’s random bits. OPT frG (PG) (OPT
in
G (PG), resp.) denotes the
value of the optimal fractional (integral, resp.) solution of PG onG. A mechanism is in-
5 [15] uses cost function rather than benefit function, viewed as Mv − bv(xv), with Mv a large
constant for any v ∈ V . The cost function is convex decreasing and it is equivalent to bv(xv)
being a concave increasing function. We use benefit function rather than cost function.
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dividually rational if each agent v has non-negative utility when he declares bv , regard-
less of the other agents’ declarations. The approximation ratio of an algorithm A w.r.t.
OPT inG (PG) (resp. OPT
fr
G (PG)) is η
in(A) = OPT inG (PG)R(A) (ηfr(A) =
OPT frG (PG)
R(A) ),
where R(A) is the objective value of the A’s solution. If unspecified, the approxima-
tion ratio refers to ηin. An FPTAS (PTAS, resp.) for a problem P is an algorithmA that
for any  > 0 and any instance I of P , outputs a solution with the objective value at
least (1 − )OPT inI (P) and terminates in time poly( 1 , |I|) (( 1 |I|)g(
1
 ), resp.), where
g is a function independent from I . Let γk = min{2k2 + 2, 8k, k
(1− 1k (1+( 2k )
1
3 ))k
} =
(e + o(1))k = O(k), and [n] = {1, . . . , n}. We use ‘vertex’ to denote the vertex in a
graph and ‘node’ to denote a vertex of the tree obtained from a tree decomposition of
a graph. An undirected graph is an outerplanar if it can be drawn in the plane without
crossings in such a way that all of the vertices belong to the unbounded face of the
drawing. An undirected graph G is k-outerplanar if for k = 1, G is outerplanar and
for k > 1, G has a planar embedding such that if all vertices on the exterior face are
deleted, the connected components of the remaining graph are all (k − 1)-outerplanar.
An planar graph is k outerplanar where k can be equal to +∞. A digraph is called a
planar graph if its undirected version is planar. We consider some standard embedding
of a planar graph and define level k vertices in a planar embedding E of a planar graph
G. A vertex is at level 1 if it is on the exterior face. Call a cycle of level i vertices a
level i face if it is an interior face in the subgraph induced by the level i vertices. For
each level i face f , let Gf be the subgraph induced by all vertices placed inside f in
this embedding. Then the vertices on the exterior face of Gt are at level i+ 1.
In Sections 3 and 4 we assume that bv and dv are both linear with slopes s0v and
s1v respectively, i.e., bv(x) = s
0
vx and dv(y) = s
1
vy, for any v ∈ V . The social
welfare function is R(x) =
∑
v∈V ωvxv , where ωv = s
0
v − s1v −
∑
u∈δ+G(v) s
1
uwvu
(R(x) =
∑
v∈V bv(xv) − dv(xv +
∑
u∈δ−G(v) wuvxu) =
∑
v∈V s
0
vxv − s1v(xv +∑
u∈δ−G(v) wuvxu) =
∑
v∈V ωvxv).
3 Directed Trees
Truthful in Expectation Mechanisms. A digraph G is called a directed tree if the
undirected graph Gun is a tree. We consider trees where arcs are directed towards the
leaves. We obtain our truthful in expectation FPTAS for PG with binary variables on any
directed trees by a two-level dynamic programming (DP) approach (used also in Section
4). The first bottom-up level is based on a careful application of the standard single-
dimensional knapsack FPTAS. The second level is by an interesting generalization of an
FPTAS of [7] for a special multi-dimensional knapsack problem, see (IP2) below, with
a constant number of constraints most of which have poly(|I|) size of coefficients. This
FPTAS generalizes the results in [7], where the authors consider the one dimensional
knapsack problem with cardinality constraint; it will appear in our paper’s full version.
We will also need the following tool from mechanism design for packing problems.
An integer linear packing problem with binary variables is a problem of maximising
a linear objective function over a set of linear packing constraints, i.e., constraints of
form a · x ≤ b where x ∈ {0, 1}n is a vector of binary variables, and a, b ∈ Rn≥0.
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Proposition 1 ([11]). Given an FPTAS for an integer linear packing problem with bi-
nary variables, there is a truthful in expectation mechanism that is an FPTAS.
We first present an FPTAS without constraint (2) which captures our main technique.
max
∑
i∈[nv ](M
vin
uiinxui +M
vin
uiout(1− xui)) + ωv
s.t. 1 + wv′v +
∑
i∈[nv ] wuivxui ≤ pv, (IP1)
xui ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ [nv]
Warmup (without global con-
straint). The algorithm uses a
DP and FPTAS for knapsack as
a subroutine. Note, on a star, any instance of knapsack can be reduced to PG without
global constraint. Thus FPTAS is the best possible for such PG unless P = NP .
We keep four values for each v ∈ V . Suppose v’s father is v′, let Mv′invin denote
the optimal value of PG on subtree rooted at v when both v′ and v are selected in the
solution. Similarly, we have Mv
′in
vout , M
v′out
vin and M
v′out
vout . Let ui, i = 1, 2, ..., nv denote
children of v. Suppose Mvinuiin, M
vin
uiout, M
vout
uiin and M
vout
uiout have been calculated, for any
i = 1, ..., nv . Some of them are undefined due to infeasibility. Now, calculate Mv
′in
vin .
Observe, Mv
′in
vin is equal to the optimal value of the knapsack (IP1), where M
vin
uiin and
Mvinuiout have finite values (otherwise remove them). If this knapsack problem has a fea-
sible solution, we get value Mv
′in
vin , otherwise set M
v′in
vin undefined. Similarly, calculate
Mv
′in
vout , M
v′out
vin and M
v′out
vout . Thus, at each step if we calculate an optimal solution, it will
be obtained by above DP approach. For knapsack with nv variables, there is an FPTAS.
Hence, at each step we get approximate value M¯v
′in
vin ≥ (1− )Mv
′in
vin in poly-time in nv
and 1 by knapsack’s FPTAS; similarly for other three values. Thus, in the final solution,
M¯root ≥ (1− )kMroot, where k is the number of levels of the tree and Mroot is PG’s
optimal value without global constraint, terminating in poly(|I|, 1 ) time; |I| is the input
size. Set 1−′ = (1−)k, then  = Θ( ′k ). The run time is poly(|I|, k′ ) = poly(|I|, 1′ )
due to k ≤ |I|, giving FPTAS for PG without global constraint.
max
∑
i∈[nv]
∑
s∈[p](M
vin
uiin(s)xis +M
vin
uiout(s)yis)
s.t.
∑
i∈[nv ]
∑
s∈[p] s(xis + yis) ≤ `− 1,∑p
s=0(xis + yis) = 1, ∀i ∈ [nv] (IP2)
1 + wv′v +
∑
i∈[nv ][wuiv(
∑p
s=0 xis)] ≤ pv,
xis, yis ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ [nv], s ∈ [p]
W.l.o.g., suppose p ≤ n, other-
wise let p = n. For each vertex
v, we keep 4p values. Let v’s fa-
ther be v′, and let Mv
′in
vin (s) be
the optimal value of PG on the
subtree rooted at v when both v′
and v are selected in the solution, and the total pollution level allocated to the sub-
tree rooted at v is ≤ s, s = 0, 1, ..., p. Similarly, we have Mv′invout(s), Mv
′out
vin (s) and
Mv
′out
vout (s). Let ui, i ∈ [nv] denote the children of v. Suppose Mvinuiin(s), Mvinuiout(s),
Mvoutuiin (s) andM
vout
uiout(s) have been calculated, for any i ∈ [nv] and s = 0, 1, ..., p. Some
of them are undefined due to infeasibility. Note, Mvinuiin(0), M
vout
uiin (0) are undefined and
Mvoutuiout(0) = M
vin
uiout(0) = 0. Now, calculate M
v′in
vin (`). Observe, M
v′in
vin (`) is equal to
the optimal value of the knapsack problem (IP2) (called KNAPSACKv(`)) plus ωv . If
Mvoutuiin (s) and M
vout
uiout(s) are undefined, they are removed from KNAPSACKv(`). Note,
xi0 ≡ 0, for any i ∈ [d]. If KNAPSACKv(`) has a feasible solution, we get the value
Mv
′in
vin (`), otherwise set M
v′in
vin (`) undefined. Similarly, calculate M
v′in
vout(`), M
v′out
vin (`),
Mv
′out
vout (`), ` = 0, 1, ..., p. From the analysis of DP without global constraint, if there
is an FPTAS for KNAPSACKv(`), then there is one for KNAPSACKroot(p), and so an
FPTAS for PG with binary variables on directed trees. Note, the second constraint in
(IP2) can be replaced by
∑p
s=1(xis + yis) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ [nv]. Then, by Proposition 1:
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Theorem 1. There is a truthful in expectation mechanism for PG with binary variables
on directed trees, which is an FPTAS.
For xv ∈ Z, we can replace each xv by qv duplicated variables xvj , j = 1, · · · , qv ,
i.e., {xv ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qv}} = {
∑
j∈[qv] jxvj |
∑
j∈[qv] xvj ≤ 1, xvj ∈ {0, 1}}. This
transforms a poly-size integer constraint into a multiple choice, one dimensional knap-
sack constraint. Hence, for directed trees, by a DP, we can construct a pseudo poly-time
algorithm to compute the exact optimal value of PG with integer variables, in time
poly(|V |, q, OPT in(PG)). And, we can remove OPT in(PG) from the running time
losing an  by scaling techniques, implying a (1 − )-approximation algorithm for PG
with integer variables with time poly(|V |, q, 1/). By Proposition 1:
Theorem 2. There is a truthful in expectation mechanism for PG with polynomial size
integer variables on directed trees, which is an FPTAS.
Deterministic Truthful Mechanisms. We use a maximal in range (MIR) mechanism
for PG with polynomial size integer variables on directed trees. By transformation from
integer constraint into multiple choice and one dimensional knapsack constraint, we
know we only need to show such approximation algorithm for binary variables. Based
on recent deterministic truthful PTAS for 2 dimensional knapsack6[9,14,8] we obtain:
Theorem 3. There is a deterministic (ηin = 3 + )- approximation truthful mecha-
nism for PG with polynomial size integer variables on directed trees, which for binary
variables terminates in O(|V |2∆6+ 1 ) time.
4 Planar Graphs
A PTAS with δ-violation: Our approach to obtain a PTAS has three main steps:
1. Round PG to an equivalent problem P¯G2 with polynomial size integer variables.
2. Using the nice tree decomposition, we present a dynamic programming approach
to solve P¯G2 optimally on an k-outerplanar graph.
3. By a shifting technique similar to [4], we obtain a PTAS with 1 + δ violation.
Step 1: Rounding Procedure. Recall that PG is equivalent to maximizing
∑
v∈V ωvxv
subject to constraints (1) - (3) where ωv = max{0, s0v − s1v −
∑
u∈δ+G(v) s
1
uwvu} and
wv,v = 1 ∀v ∈ V , and bv and dv are both linear with slopes s0v and s1v . For each v ∈ V ,
suppose qv ∈ [2ov−1 − 1, 2ov − 1). Let ov = blog2(qv)c + 1 if qv 6= 2ov−1 − 1 and
ov = blog2(qv)c + 2 otherwise; civ = 2i−1, i ∈ [ov − 1] and covv = qv − 2ov−1 + 1.
Notice, {xv |xv ∈ Z, 0 ≤ xv ≤ qv} = {
∑ov
i=1 c
i
vy
i
v | yiv ∈ {0, 1}, i ∈ [ov]}, for any
v ∈ V . Thus, PG is equivalent to the following integer program (denoted as PG′):
max
∑
v∈V
∑ov
i=1 ωvc
i
vy
i
v (PG
′) | max ∑v∈V ∑ovi=1 ωvbivyiv (P¯G1)
s.t.
∑
v∈V
∑ov
i=1 c
i
vy
i
v ≤ p, | s.t.
∑
v∈V
∑ov
i=1 c
i
vy
i
v ≤ p
∀v ∈ V : ∑ovi=1 wvvcivyiv+ | ∀v ∈ V : ∑ovi=1 w¯ivvyiv+
+
∑
u∈δ−G(v)
∑su
i=1 wuvc
i
uy
i
u ≤ pv, | +
∑
u∈δ−G(v)
∑su
i=1 w¯
i
uvy
i
v ≤ p¯v
∀v ∈ V, i ∈ [ov] : yiv ∈ {0, 1}, | ∀v ∈ V, i ∈ [ov] : yiv ∈ {0, 1}
6 This PTAS also works for multiple choice and constant dimensional knapsack problem, which
will be used for PG with polynomial size integer variables.
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Let o∗ = maxv∈V ov and ρ = o∗|V |. Recall that q = maxv∈V {qv} + 1. For any
δ > 0, let w¯iuv = b 2wuvc
i
vρ
pvδ
c and p¯v = d 2pvρpvδ e = d
2ρ
δ e, for any u, v ∈ V . Then we have
the following modified PG′ (denoted as P¯G1 – see above.)
Lemma 1. Any feasible solution of PG′ is feasible in P¯G1, and any feasible solution
of P¯G1 is feasible for PG except violating each local constraint by a factor of 1 + δ.
Proof. We only prove local constraints for each direction since the proof of the global
constraint is similar. Let {yiv}v∈V, i∈[ov] be a feasible solution of PG′. We know that∑ov
i=1 wvvc
i
vy
i
v +
∑
u∈δ−G(v)
∑su
i=1 wuvc
i
uy
i
v ≤ pv , ∀v ∈ V . Then
∑ov
i=1 w¯
i
vvy
i
v +∑
u∈δ−G(v)
∑su
i=1 w¯
i
uvy
i
v ≤ 2ρpvδ (
∑ov
i=1 wvvc
i
vy
i
v+
∑
u∈δ−G(v)
∑su
i=1 wuvc
i
uy
i
v) ≤ 2ρpvδpv ≤
p¯v as desired. On the other hand, suppose {yiv}v∈V, i∈[ov] is a feasible solution of P¯G1.
We know
∑ov
i=1 w¯
i
vvy
i
v+
∑
u∈δ−G(v)
∑su
i=1 w¯
i
uvy
i
v ≤ p¯v , ∀v ∈ V . Then
∑ov
i=1 wvvc
i
vy
i
v+∑
u∈δ−G(v)
∑su
i=1 wuvc
i
uy
i
v ≤ pvδ2ρ [
∑ov
i=1(w¯
i
vv+1)y
i
v+
∑
u∈δ−G(v)
∑su
i=1(w¯
i
uv+1)y
i
v] ≤
pvδ
2ρ w¯
i
vvy
i
v +
∑
u∈δ−G(v)
∑su
i=1 w¯
i
uvy
i
v +
pvδρ
2ρ ≤ pvδp¯v2ρ + pvδ2 ≤ pvδ2ρ ( 2ρδ + 1) + pvδ2 ≤
pv(1 + δ), ∀v ∈ V . uunionsq
max
∑
v∈V ωvxv (P¯G2)
s.t.
∑
v∈V xv ≤ p
∀v ∈ V : w¯vv(xv) +
∑
u∈δ−G(v) w¯uv(xu) ≤ p¯v∀v ∈ V : xv ∈ Λv
Note, for each ` ∈ [qv],
there is a solution {yiv}i∈[ov ]
s.t.
∑ov
i=1 c
i
vy
i
v = `. We use
the following solution: If ` ≤
2ov−1−1, set yovv = 0 and there
is a unique solution
∑ov
i=1 c
i
vy
i
v = `; If 2
ov−1 − 1 < ` ≤ qv , set yovv = qv − 2ov−1 + 1
and there is also a unique solution s.t.
∑ov
i=1 c
i
vy
i
v = `. Hence, there is one-to-one corre-
spondence from xv to {yiv}i∈[ov]. Notice that for a given xv , the above defined solution
{yiv}i∈[ov] is the one such that
∑ov
i=1 w¯
i
vvy
i
v +
∑
u∈δ−G(v)
∑su
i=1 w¯
i
uvy
i
v is minimized.
Now let w¯vu(xv) =
∑ov
i=1 w¯
i
vuy
i
v , for any v, u ∈ V , where {yiv}i∈[ov] is according to
the above solution corresponding to xv . Let Λv = [qv] ∪ {0}. Thus, P¯G1 (also PG) is
equivalent to the integer program (denoted as P¯G2, see above).
Step 2: Preliminaries of Tree Decompositions on k-outerplanar Graphs
Definition 1. A tree decomposition of an undirected graph G = (V,E) is a pair
({Xi|i ∈ I}, T = (I, F )), with {Xi|i ∈ I} a family of subsets of V , one for each node
of T , and T a tree such that: 1)
⋃
i∈I Xi = V , 2) for all edges (v, w) ∈ E, there exists
an i ∈ I with v ∈ Xi and w ∈ Xi, 3) for all i, j, k ∈ I: if j is on the path from i to k in
T , then Xi∩Xk ⊆ Xj . The width of a tree decomposition ({Xi|i ∈ I}, T = (I, F )) is
maxi∈I |Xi|−1. The minimum width of all tree decompositions ofG is called treewidth.
Definition 2. A tree decomposition ({Xi|i ∈ I}, T = (I, F )) of G = (V,E) is called
a nice tree decomposition if T is a rooted binary tree and 1) if a node i ∈ I has two
children j and k, then Xi = Xj = Xk (joint node), 2) if a node i ∈ I has one child
j, then either Xi ⊂ Xj , and |Xi| = |Xj | − 1 (forget node), or Xj ⊂ Xi and |Xj | =
|Xi| − 1 (introduce node), 3) if node i ∈ I is a leaf of T , then |Xi| = 1 (leaf node).
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Lemma 2 ([12]). For any k-outerplanar graph G = (V,E), there is an algorithm to
compute a tree decomposition ({Xi|i ∈ I}, T = (I, F )) of G with treewidth at most
3k − 1 = O(k), and I = O(|V |) in O(k|V |) time.
Given a tree decomposition ({Xi|i ∈ I}, T = (I, F )) forG = (V,E) with treewidth k
and I = O(|V |), we can obtain a nice tree decomposition with the same treewidth k and
the number of nodesO(k|V |) inO(k2|V |) time [13]. Thus, for any k-outerplanar graph
G = (V,E), we can compute a nice tree decomposition ({Xi|i ∈ I}, T = (I, F )) of
G with treewidth at most 3k − 1 = O(k), and I = O(k|V |) in O(k2|V |) time. In the
following, we suppose there is a nice tree decomposition for any k-outerplanar graph.
Dynamic Programming (DP). A DP to solve P¯G2 on a k-outerplanar digraph is pre-
sented by using a nice tree decomposition of its undirected version. Note, a nice tree
decomposition of an undirected version of digraph is also a nice tree decomposition
of itself. Given nice tree decomposition ({Xi|i ∈ I}, T = (I, F )) of a k-outerplanar
digraph G = (V,E), using a bottom-up approach, DP for P¯G2 works as follows.
For any node i ∈ I , suppose Xi = {vi1, vi2, · · · , vit}, where t ≤ 3k. We also say
vertex vi1 belongs to node Xi, similarly we can say a vertex belongs to a subtree of T ,
meaning this vertex belongs to some node of this subtree. Given any emission amount
{xv}v∈V , recall w¯vv(xv) +
∑
u∈δ−G(v) w¯uv(xu) is the local level of pollution of vertex
v. We use ai = (ai1, a
i
2, · · · , ait) to denote the emission amount allocated to vertices in
Xi, i.e., ais denotes the emission amount allocated to the vertex v
i
s, s ∈ [t]. Similarly
`i denotes the local levels of pollution of vertices in Xi. Let Gi denote the subgraph
generated by all the vertices belonging to the subtree (nodeXi) rooted atXi. We useQi
to denote the total emission quota allocated toGi. LetΩi(ai, `i, Qi) denote the optimal
objective value of P¯G2 restricted on the subgraph Gi, when the emission amount and
local level of pollution of vis are exactly a
i
s and `
i
s, s ∈ [t], and the total emission
amount allocated to Gi is exactly Qi. If there is no feasible solution for Ωi(ai, `i, Qi),
we will see that our DP approach will automatically set Ωi(ai, `i, Qi) to be −∞. Let
w¯uv(xv) ≡ 0 if (u, v) is not an edge inG. Note that the range of ais we need to compute
is in Λv , and `is is from 0 to p¯vis , s ∈ [t], Qi is from 0 to p. We present the DP approach
– Xi is a leaf node or a start node, where t = 1. Ωi(ai1, `i1, Qi) = ωvi1a
i
1 if the
triple (ai, `i, Qi) is feasible, which can be verified easily e.g. Qi = ai1 and `
i
1 =
w¯vi1vi1(a
i
1). Let Ωi(a
i
1, `
i
1, Q
i) = −∞ if the triple (ai, `i, Qi) is not feasible.
– Xi is a forget node, and suppose its child is Xj = Xi ∪ {vjt+1}.
Ωi(a
i, `i, Qi) = maxajt+1,`
j
t+1
Ωj(a
i, ajt+1, `
i, `jt+1, Q
i)
– Xi is an introduce node, and suppose its child is Xj = Xi\{vit}. Let ajs = ais and
`js = `
i
s − w¯vitvis(ait), ∀s ∈ [t− 1]. Ωi(ai, `i, Qi) = Ωj(aj , `j , Qi − ait) + ωvitait
if
∑
s∈[t] w¯visvit(a
i
s) = `
i
t, and Ωi(a
i, `i, Qi) = −∞ otherwise.
– Xi is a joint node, and suppose its two children areXj = Xk = Xi.Ωi(ai, `i, Qi) =
maxA{Ωj(aj , `j , Qj) +Ωk(ak, `k, Qk)}, where the condition
A = {(aj , `j , Qj), (ak, `k, Qk) |aj + ak = ai, `j + `k = `i, Qj +Qk = Qi}.
– Xi is the root of T , OPT (Qi) = maxai,`i{Ωi(ai, `i, Qi)} is the optimal value
(social welfare) of P¯G2 when total scaled emission amount is exactly Qi, i.e., the
global constraint satisfies
∑
v∈V bvxv = Q
i.
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Analysis of Running Time of DP. It is not difficult to see that the above DP approach
gives the correct solution of P¯G2 on k-outerplanar graphs. For each node Xi, we need
to keep O(pq3kd 2ρδ e3k) = O(|V |q3k+1d 2ρδ e3k) number of Ωi values. Each Ωi can be
computed in O(|V |q3k+1d 2ρδ e3k) time (this is the worst case running time when Xi is
a joint node). There are O(k|V |) nodes in T . Therefore, the total running time of the
DP approach (by multiplying above three numbers) is O(k|V |3q6k+2d 2ρδ e6k).
Based on the above DP approach, we can solve P¯G2 on any k-outerplanar graph
optimally for any fixed k (which includes any directed tree whose treewidth is 2). There-
fore, for any δ > 0 and fixed k, we can use VCG (see, e.g., Chapter 9 in [18]) to get an
optimal deterministic truthful mechanism for PG on any directed k-outerplanar graph
that violates each local constraint by a factor of δ and runs in O(k|V |3q6k+2d 2ρδ e6k)
time (note that Theorem 4 also works for bounded treewidth graphs).
Theorem 4. For any δ > 0 and fixed k, there is an optimal deterministic truthful mech-
anism for PG on any directed k-outerplanar graph G = (V,E) that violates each
local constraint by a factor of 1 + δ and runs in O(k|V |3q6k+2d 2ρδ e6k) time, where
ρ = |V |(blog2(q)c+ 2).
Step 3: PTAS for Planar Graphs Observe that when there are some boundary con-
ditions on k-outerplanar, the above DP approach still works. For example, if the emis-
sion amount of any vertex in any first and last face (level 1 and level k face) of the
k-outerplanar graph is zero, we just modify the dynamic programming approach in a
bottom-up manner to set Ωi = −∞ if any vertex v in any first and last face is a pa-
rameter of Ωi and its emission amount aiv > 0. Then the modified DP approach is the
desired algorithm for P¯G2 on the k-outerplanar graph under this boundary condition.
Proposition 2. PG is strongly NP-hard on planar graphs with degree at most 3 when
we allow a (1 + δ)-violation of local constraints.
Theorem 5. For any fixed k and δ > 0, there is an O(k2|V |3q6k+2d 2ρδ e6k) algorithm
for PG with integer variables on directed planar graph G = (V,E) that achieves
(ηin = kk−2 )-approximation and violates each local constraint by a factor of 1 + δ,
where ρ = |V |(blog2(q)c+ 2).
Proof. We use OPT (P¯G2) to denote OPT inG (P¯G2) and omit the superscript and sub-
script. By Lemma 1, we know OPT = OPT (PG) ≤ OPT (P¯G2). Let P¯G2(i) de-
note the P¯G2 restricted on G by setting xv = 0 for each v who belongs to any face
f ≡ i or i + 1 (modk). Let {x∗v}v∈V be an optimal solution for P¯G2. Then we know∑
i∈[k]
∑
v∈f :f≡i or i+1(mod k) x
∗
v = 2OPT (P¯G2). As a consequence, there exists i ∈
[k] such that
∑
v∈f :f≡i or i+1(mod k) x
∗
v ≤ 2OPT (P¯G2)k . Observe that {xv}v∈V is a fea-
sible solution for P¯G2(i), where xv = 0 if v belongs to any face f ≡ i or i+1 (modk)
and xv = x∗v otherwise. Thus, OPT (P¯G2(i)) ≥ (1− 2k )OPT (P¯G2) ≥ (1− 2k )OPT .
Solving each P¯G2(i), i ∈ [k], then choosing maxi∈[k]{OPT (P¯G2(i))} (which is at
least (1− 2k )OPT ) gives the desired result. Now let us see how to solve P¯G2(i). Note
that for P¯G2(i), xv = 0 for any v who belongs to any face f ≡ i or i + 1 (modk).
P¯G2(i) consists of independent k′−outerplanar graphs, each of which has some bound-
ary condition i.e. the emission amount of any vertex in any first and last face is zero
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and k′ ≤ k. Suppose the number of these independent k′-outerplanar graphs is Li.
W.l.o.g. suppose these k′-outerplanar graphs are ordered from exterior to interior as
Gs = (Vs, Es), s ∈ [Li] (e.g. Gs is the subgraph of G constructed by all the vertices of
levels from (s− 2)k+ i+ 1 to (s− 1)k+ i, s = 2, · · · , Li− 1, with boundary xv = 0
if v is of level (s− 2)k + i+ 1 or (s− 1)k + i).
Let Ωs(Qs) denote the optimal value if there is a solution such that the total al-
located scaled emission amount to Gs is exactly Qs with boundary condition and
Ωs(Q
s) = 0 otherwise, which can be solved by the above DP approach on k′-outerplanar
graphs with boundary conditions. Then, it is not difficult to see the optimal solution for
P¯G2(i) is the optimal solution of the following integer linear program (denoted SUB):
max
∑
s∈[Li]
∑p
Qs=0Ωs(Q
s)ysQs
s.t.
∑
s∈[Li]
∑p
Qs=0Q
sysQs ≤ p∑p
Qs=0 ysQs = 1
ysQs ∈ {0, 1}∀s ∈ [Li], Qs ∈ [p]
Let gt(Q) denote the optimal in-
teger value of SUB when only
Gs, s ∈ [t] is considered and
the total emission amount allo-
cated to these graphs is exactly
Q. Then we have the following recursion function: gt(Q) = maxQt=0,1,··· ,Q{gt−1(Q−
Qt) + Ωt(Q
t)}. The optimal value of SUB is maxQ=0,1,··· ,p{gLi(Q)}, which
gives the optimal solution of P¯G2(i) by tracking the optimal value of this dy-
namic programming approach. The running time of this approach is O(|Li|p2).
Hence, the total running time for obtaining and solving P¯G2(i) is O(|Li|p2) +∑
s∈[Li]O(k|Vs|3q6k+2d 2ρδ e6k) = O(k|V |3q6k+2d 2ρδ e6k). We need to solve P¯G2(i),
for each i ∈ [k] and then get maxi∈[k]{OPT (P¯G2(i))}. Therefore, the overall running
time is O(k2|V |3q6k+2d 2ρδ e6k), and Theorem 5 is proved. uunionsq
Let 2k =  in Theorem 5. Also note that ρ = |V |(blog2(q)c+ 2). We have:
Theorem 6. There isO
(
1
2 |V |12/+3q2d 2(blog2 qc+2)qδ e12/+1
)
=
(
|V |q(log2 q+2)
δ
)O( 1 )
time algorithm for PG for fixed δ,  > 0 on directed planar graph G = (V,E) that
achieves social welfare (1 − )OPT in(PG) and violates each local constraint by a
factor of 1 + δ. This is a PTAS for PG with polynomial size integer variables.
5 General Objective Function for Bounded Degree Graphs
Full details of our results for general objective functions will appear in the full version
of the paper. Our most general algorithmic result is given in Theorem 7.
Theorem 7. Let xv ∈ {0, 1} for any v ∈ V . Assume that R(x) is monotone increasing
as set function on sets S ⊆ V s.t. v ∈ S iff xv = 1. Then there is an (ηfr = eγ∆+2e−1 +1)-
approximation algorithm for PG with integer variables on graphs with degree ≤ ∆.
Our hardness results for general objective functions are Theorems 8 and 9. By a reduc-
tion from independent set we get the following:
Theorem 8. PG is Unique Games-hard to approximate within n1− and within ∆
log2∆
for G with degree ∆ when pv is any constant number ≥ 1 , bv(xv) is linear and dv(y)
is piecewise linear (with 2 pieces) ∀v ∈ V and wvu is positive constant ∀(v, u) ∈ E.
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Theorem 9. It is strongly NP-hard to find an optimal solution to Pollution Game (PG)
when pv is any constant number ≥ 1 , bv(xv) is linear and dv(y) is piecewise linear
(with two pieces) ∀v ∈ V and wvu is positive constant for any (v, u) ∈ E.
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